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Abstract
Quality in software is often understood as "execution according to design purpose" whereas se-
curity means that "software will not put data or computing systems at risk of unauthorized access."
There seems to be a connection between these two aspects but, how do we integrate both of them
in the robotics development cycle? In this article we introduce DevSecOps in Robotics, a set of best
practices designed to help roboticists implant security deep in the heart of their development and
operations processes. First, we briefly describe DevOps, introduce the value added with DevSecOps
and describe and illustrate how these practices may be implemented in the robotics field. We finalize
with a discussion on the relationship between security, quality and safety, open problems and future
research questions.
1 Introduction
Figure 1: The DevOps cycle and its four phases: a) development, b) deployment, c) production and d)
post-production
Where waterfall development once dictated the process of "handing off" from developers to Quality
Assurance (QA) to operations, these responsibilities now have blurred borders with most engineers’
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skill sets spanning multiple disciplines. Enter DevOps, a set of practices that combine software de-
velopment (Dev) with Information Technology operations (Ops). They aim to shorten the development
life cycle and provide continuous delivery while ensuring the quality of the software (Quality Assurance
or QA)[1]. Most sources [2, 3] agree that this idea began around 2008, with a discussion between
Patrick Debois and Andrew Clay Shafer, concerning the concept of agile infrastructure. According
to Roche [4], no standard definition exists for DevOps. What seems clear is that the design phase has
been replaced by a less cyclic and more integrated flow evolution from development to demonstrations.
In Robotics, as in many other areas closely connected to Computer Science, there is a set of adopted
common practices, including DevOps. Figure 1 pictures the DevOps cycle most roboticists use and split
into 4 phases: Development, Deployment, Production and Post-Production. In the DevOps philosophy,
these phases are all connected in a continuous, never-ending, loop. The waterfall is now a river; de-
velopment and operations flow together but, where is security in such a landscape? As pointed out by
the UK’s National Cyber Security Center [5], having a secure approach to development has never been
so critical, when it comes to cyberphysical systems and, of course, robotics. The way roboticists build
software and systems is rapidly evolving, becoming more and more automated and integrated. Many
roboticists today define, prototype and develop an entire robotics system architecture in simulation and
tie it to tooling which will automate both testing and deployment.
Over the last couple of years we have seen big changes on the arrival of cloud services to robotics
and to ’robot infrastructure as a service’ including simulation, fleet management systems, or teleop-
eration capabilities among others. The promise is that robots of almost any size and complexity can
be called into virtual life, changed, or terminated without leaving the desktop. On top of these new
capabilities, a process of quick and regular deployments has evolved. Often referred to as Continuous
Delivery, this iterative approach is powerful, flexible and efficient, but these strengths bring new sets
of risks which your security practices must address. To do so, roboticists will need to consider security
as a primary concern throughout your development and deployment processes.
To the best of our knowledge, while there is some prior work studying DevOps in the embedded
systems field [6], there is no literature available to date formalizing the adoption of DevSecOps in
the robotics domain. In this article we introduce DevSecOps in Robotics as a set of best practices
designed to help roboticists implant security deep in the heart of their development and operations
processes. The content provided below is not an in-depth guidance on how to avoid implementa-
tion vulnerabilities in the code you write, this topic is covered by other pieces of research and we
kindly refer the reader to [7, 8, 9, 10]. The principles provided below are intended to help secure
the entire process of software development in robotics, from establishing a security-friendly culture in
your organisation through implementation and ongoing management. It must be noted, however, that
using these principles do not guarantee a secure final robot, but should help you gain confidence and
insights that the code you deploy is built with a security mindset.
2 From DevOps to DevSecOps
Roche [4] argues that developers work mostly on code while operations people work mostly with sys-
tems. Security, well identified as a continuous process, needs to be applied individually to each one
of these phases and then holistically to the complete system. Security is a challenge and with each
interface, the complexity increases.
DevOps is presented with a mix of the two skill sets mentioned above, developers and operations peo-
ple. When adding security to the DevOps tuple we dive into DevSecOps. Often times called "Rugged
DevOps" or “security at speed”, DevSecOps is a set of best practices designed to help organizations
implant security deep in their DevOps development and operations processes [11, 12]. DevSecOps,
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also known as SecDevOps and DevOpsSec, seeks to embed security inside the development process as
deeply as DevOps does with operations.
Turning again into robotics, security –identified as a process that needs to be continuously assessed
both in hardware and software– is a highly time and resource-consuming task. As was proven before
in Computer Science, including security –across the development, deployment, production, and post-
production phases– results in a more secure output. Figure 2 depicts our view on how DevSecOps could
be implemented in robotics. We list phases, tasks, and activities while providing descriptions to further
clarify the effort required.
Development phase
Plan task
• Threat modeling: Threat modeling is the use of abstractions to aid in thinking about risks.
A threat model identifies security threats that apply to the robot and/or its components (both
software and hardware) while providing means to address or mitigate them in the context of a
use case and ideally, during development.
• Quality Assurance requirements: Quality Assurance (QA) requirements imply capturing the
quality metrics and aspects that will be later used to measure a code’s compliance. The require-
ments captured in this activity are later translated into actionable tests.
• Unit, integration and functional tests: Unit testing is the practice of testing small pieces of
code, typically individual functions, alone and in an isolated manner. Integration testing involves
checking whether different modules perform when combined together as a group. Finally, func-
tional testing verifies the functionality of a given software composition, that is to confirm that the
corresponding source code provides the expected behavior. In line with Test-Driven Development
and other groups’ practices [13], it is encouraged to write tests before coding. Particularly, we
encourage to a) write the general code skeleton, classes, and public methods and to b) write the
test cases for the logic to implement1.
Code task
• IDE checks: Many vulnerabilities in products and systems could be avoided if better, more secure
coding practices were in place. A number of Integrated Development Environment (IDE) plugins
exist, which help developers check for security flaws while they code [14].
• Peer code review: Peer Code Review, is the act of consciously and systematically analyzing fel-
low programmers’ code to check each other’s mistakes. Bosu et al. produced two interesting
studies [15, 16] that researched vulnerabilities in code-while-in-development where they con-
cluded that: a) the most experienced contributors authored the majority of the Vulnerable Code
Changes (VCCs), b) Less experienced authors wrote fewer VCCs, but their code changes were
1.5 to 8 times more likely to be vulnerable, and c) employees of organizations sponsoring OSS
(Open Source Software) projects were more likely to write VCCs. Coherently, peer code review is
identified as an effective improvement practice for reducing security vulnerabilities.
Build task
• Software Component Analysis (SCA): Software Component (or Composition) Analysis (SCA)
is the process of identifying potential areas of risk from the use of third-party and open-source
software components. In robotics, this could be very easily extended to hardware as well. SCA
generally involves using a variety of different tools.
1Note that these tests should fail at this point
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Figure 2: A flowchart of DevSecOps for robotics
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• Static Application Security Testing (SAST): Static Application Security Testing, or static anal-
ysis, is the study of software without executing it and by simply looking at its structure and
content. SAST is a testing methodology that analyzes source code to find security vulnerabilities.
• Alert on high-risk code changes: As a general recommendation, when the delta of code
changes is above a certain pre-defined boundary, alerts should be generated.
• Build (compilation) checks: CI systems generally involve one or more building process. Com-
pilation output can deliver valuable input and should be accounted for. It is good practice to
monitor a compiler’s output and file tickets for review in the warnings that remain. This can
be easily automated and tickets can be filed to a centralized flaw management system like the
Robot Vulnerability Database (RVD) [17]. An open prototype of such a flaw management system,
integrated with Github, is available at https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD including the
necessary tooling to manage it.
Test and simulate task
• Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST): Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)
is a practice to detect conditions indicative of a security vulnerability in an application or software
in its running state. The software is tested from the outside, that is, no access to the source code
is assumed to be provided and thereby falls into the black-box security testing methodologies
(against SAST, which requires access to the source code and is thereby considered a white-box
security testing methodology).
• Deep Static Application Security Testing (Deep SAST): Past studies have shown [18, 19,
20, 21] that it is possible to predict both code quality and security flaws using machine learning
approaches. Deep Static Application Security Testing (Deep SAST) leverages on the the effective-
ness of using machine learning-based static analysis to predict security flaws.
• Fuzz testing: Fuzz testing or fuzzing, is a semi-automated testing technique for software that
consists of injecting data in search for errors. It involves providing invalid, unexpected, or ran-
dom data as input. The software is then monitored for exceptions such as crashes, failing code
assertions, or potential memory leaks. Similar to DAST, fuzzing is a black-box security testing
methodology (no access to the source code).
• Penetration Testing (PT or pentesting): Penetration testing or pentesting, is the practice
of simulating a cyber attack against a given system (with a well defined scope) to check for
exploitable vulnerabilities and determining its severity. Pentesting aims to find as many vulner-
abilities and configuration issues as possible, in the time allotted, to then try exploit those to
determine the risk of the vulnerability. A pentesting activity can be conducted as a white-box
activity (complete access to source code), black-box (no access to sources or prior knowledge of
the system) or gray-box (limited knowledge of the system available). Some penetration testing
schemes are applicable to robotics, such as Robot Security Framework [22].
Flaw management task
• Flaw management activity: Formally [23], flaw management is the cyclical practice of identify-
ing, classifying, re-mediating, and mitigating flaws. Flaw management is at the center of security
activity. It refers to the process of how security researchers, suppliers, and end user organizations
manage bugs and vulnerabilities, making systems more secure.
Flaw management requires a holistic, risk-based approach to security and combines the input
received from other phases and tasks in the security process (e.g. SAST, DAST, build warnings,
pentesting, fuzzing, etc.). The amount of flaws is often bigger than the engineering resources to
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manage them, thereby flaws should be prioritized. This is often done using a preliminary risk as-
sessment, which is typically performed by using severity scoring mechanisms such as CVSS [24]
or RVSS [25], the latter more specific for robotics and accounting for safety hazards.
Deployment phase
• Configuration and system integration task: Deals with system integration and configuration
of all parts previously developed and conforming the robotic system. It is one of the most sensitive
tasks from a security perspective. It is critical to define secure deployment mechanisms and
employ strong systematic configuration practices to ensure no flaws are presented during this
task.
Production phase
• Monitor: This task deals with the continuous monitoring of the system and should oversee the
systems’ performance, errors, and other relevant information. A common good practice is to
employ elements that record all activity, securely, for potential future forensics research.
Post-production phase
Analyze task
• Vulnerability Scans: Vulnerability scans provide results on new vulnerabilities affecting your
system and provides solid data on their levels of severity. This data should be fed into the Flaw
Management system and prioritized based on common scoring mechanisms.
• Red Teaming: Red teaming is a full-scope, holistic, multi-layered, and targeted (specific goals)
attack simulation designed to measure how well a company’s systems, people, networks, and
physical security controls can withstand an attack. Opposed to Penetration Testing, a red teaming
activity does not seek to find as many vulnerabilities as possible to risk-assess them, instead it has
a specific goal to look for vulnerabilities that will maximize damage and meet the goal. The
ultimate objective of a red teaming activity is to test organization/system detection and response
capabilities in production.
• Bug Bounties: A Bug Bounty program is a coordinated and well scoped effort to encourage se-
curity research in a particular system rewarding (with bounties) those researchers who help find
bugs. Bug Bounty programs utilize a pay for results model, favour competition and often leverage
the crowd sourced model. Bug bounty programs can be self hosted or coordinated by third parties.
There are several online providers that offer support organizing the programs. When compared
to other actions such as red teaming, bug bounty programs are generally result-oriented and add
more diversity on the testers side (crowd-sourcing). On the down side, bug bounty programs do
not generally have highly skilled security researchers and they require extensive program man-
agement (either on you or hired).
Figure 3 presents a graphical representation of the DevSecOps cycle in the robotics domain.
3 Discussion and future work
With DevOps, engineering efforts now serve multiple masters. Where the focus used to be purely on
precision, now longevity, scalability and security (with DevSecOps) hold equal footing in product re-
quirement discussions. Where Quality Assurance (QA) had traditionally held the line on risk definition
and maintainability, Security now has an equal, if not dominant, role.
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Figure 3: A graphical representation of the DevSecOps cycle for robotics.
Quality (Quality Assurance or QA for short) and Security are often misunderstood when it comes
to software. Ivers argues [26] that quality "essentially means that the software will execute according
to its design and purpose" while "security means that the software will not put data or computing sys-
tems at risk of unauthorized access". Within [26] one relevant open question that arises is whether the
quality problems are also security issues or vice versa. Ivers indicates that quality bugs can turn into
security ones, provided they are exploitable, and addresses the question by remarking that quality and
security are critical components to a broader notion: software integrity. Coming from the same group,
Vamosi [27] argues that "quality code may not always be secure, but secure code must always be qual-
ity code". This somehow conflicts with the previous view and leads one to think that secure software
is a subset of quality. The authors of this article reject this view and argue instead that Quality and
Security remain two separate properties of software that may intersect on certain aspects (e.g. testing).
As nicely indicated by Lopez [28] for the DevOps scenario and extending it for security, in the De-
vSecOps scenario, both security and QA integrate into the testing and development processes and take
a collaborative approach. Quality and Security are ensured throughout the testing and delivery cycles
and both the testing and development teams are responsible for them. In other words, compared to
the traditional waterfall pattern where quality creeps in toward the end, with DevSecOps security and
quality come in at every level.
In robotics there is a clear separation between Security and Quality that is best understood with sce-
narios involving robotic software components. For example, if one was building an industrial Auto-
mated Guided Vehicle (AGV), Autonomous Mobile Robots (AMRs) or a self-driving vehicle, often, she/he
would need to comply with coding standards (e.g. MISRA [29] for developing safety-critical systems).
The same system’s communications, however, regardless of its compliance with the coding standards,
might rely on a channel that does not provide encryption or authentication and is thereby subject to
eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Security would be a strong driver here and as remarked
by Vamosi [26], "neither security nor quality would be mutually exclusive, there will be elements of
both".
Quality in robotics, still on its early stages [30] (though much more developed than security in the
author’s opinion), is often viewed as a pre-condition for Safety-critical systems. Similarly, as argued
by several, safety can not be guaranteed without security [31, 32]. Coding standards such as MISRA C
have been extended [33, 34] to become the "C coding standard" of choice for the automotive industry
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and for all industries developing embedded systems that are safety-critical and/or security-critical [32].
As introduced by ISO/IEC TS 17961:2013 "in practice, security-critical and safety-critical code have
the same requirements". This statement is somehow supported by Goertzel [31] but emphasized the
importance of software remaining dependable under extraordinary conditions and the interconnection
between safety and security in software. This same argument was later extended by Bagnara [32]
who acknowledges that having embedded systems, non-isolated anymore, plays a key role in the re-
lationship between safety and security. According to Bagnara, "while safety and security are distinct
concepts, when it comes to connected software" (non-isolated) "not having one implies not having the
other", referring to integrity.
Acknowledging that both Security and QA are embed into the DevSecOps cycle brings us to question
whether safety –connected to Quality– could also fit in. Myklebust et al. [35] argue that DevOps, with
its frequent changes, make systems’ maintainability – e.g., change impact analysis – a more challenging
topic, which makes it more difficult to integrate safety within the DevOps cycle. They do acknowledge
though that DevOps is also a considerable trend for non-critical systems and make an interesting con-
nection between safety and security, which indirectly leads to DevSecOps. In a similar line of thought,
Johnson [36] indicates that the time and cost involved in this process makes the DevOps paradigm of
continuous release challenging for safety-critical software, especially in delivering to the end customer.
He, however, points out that despite this, "aviation and defense teams have embraced the principles of
DevOps, especially at the pre-certification stage, because of the potential for the higher overall quality
it offers".
Altogether this leads us to the following questions: how do we apply safety-critical practices to the
DevSecOps cycle in robotics? And more importantly, if safety and security coding (software) standards
do not guarantee that the final robotic system will be secure, will it be safe given the safety and security
connection? Some preliminary work [37, 38] tackles the first question and indicates that Model-Driven
Engineering (MDE) frameworks might allow a mix of DevSecOps with the functional safety process.
Further research on these questions remains open for future efforts.
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